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Abstract
Background: The HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa is widely recognised as a
development disaster threatening poverty reduction, economic growth and not merely a health
issue. Its mitigation includes the societal-wide adoption and implementation of specific health
technologies, many of which depend on functional institutions and State.
Discussion: Donor and International Institutions' strategies to mitigate HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan
Africa are premised on a single optimal model of the State, one which focuses on the decentralised
delivery of public goods alone (such as healthcare) – the service delivery state. The empirical
evidence, though sparse, of "successful" and "unsuccessful" sub-Saharan Africa states' performance
in mitigating HIV/AIDS does not support this model. Rather, the evidence suggests an alternative
model that takes a country context specific approach – encompassing political power, institutional
structures and the level of health technology needed. This model draws on the historical
experience of East Asian countries' rapid development.
Summary: For international public health policies to be effective, they must consider a country
tailored approach, one that advocates a coordinated strategy designed and led by the State with
involvement of wider society specific to each country's particular history, culture, and level of
development.
Background
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a
human and development disaster [1]. Now significant
donor resources are available to fund mitigation strategies
[2-4]. However, the approach to HIV/AIDS in SSA has
been criticised as being based on health policies from
industrialised countries which treat HIV/AIDS differently
from other sexually transmitted infections – HIV excep-
tionalism. Some have called for a new strategy based on a
public health model that rejects uniform approaches to
the epidemic, emphasises social justice and public health,
rather than only individual human rights [5]. We ask, are
there limitations too, in the model of the State that cur-
rent mitigation policies assume and insist are optimal for
SSA? Though the evidence-base is sparse, our findings sug-
gest that persisting with the current model risks possible
failure of the donor mitigation strategies – there is an
imperative to consider countries' diversity and context in
designing mitigation strategies.
Donors are funding the implementation and expansion of
anti-HIV/AIDS programmes incorporating treatment for
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ally targeted at low-income SSA countries that have a high
HIV/AIDS prevalence and have conditions attached that
insist on adopting the current state model – the Service
Delivery State (SDS).
We begin by outlining the necessary technological ele-
ments of an effective anti-HIV/AIDS strategy, then
describe the SDS, and review the empirical evidence of
SSA State's performance in HIV/AIDS mitigation. Finally
we explore a different State model and the consequences
of persisting with the international mitigation strategies.
Mitigation strategies
Mitigation strategies exist to control, treat, and prevent
HIV/AIDS and are a form of technology (including insti-
tutional organisation) that a State needs to adopt in order
to achieve mitigation [6]. Mitigation encompasses more
than health (e.g. agricultural, industrial interventions) but
here we focus on health. This technology varies in com-
plexity and, to simplify, includes prevention, treatment
for sexually transmitted infections (STI's), and HIV/AIDS
therapy (table 1). Ideally, a comprehensive strategy would
have all three technologies. Prevention aims to educate
and change individual and group behaviours. The treat-
ment of sexually transmitted infections (STI's) also
reduces the risk of HIV transmission. More technical,
however, is ARV, which involves taking a regimen of drugs
daily, adhering to this schedule, and the treatment and
monitoring of opportunistic infections. ARV is effective
(and lifelong), making HIV/AIDS a chronically managed
disease.
The State plays an important role in the interventions
described above that other providers (say, non-govern-
mental organisations (NGO's) or private) either cannot or
have a limited role. Many of these technologies are
dependent on a functioning State and institutional struc-
ture that reflects these technological requirements. The
State is the legitimate body that can lead societal-wide
efforts to prioritise and co-ordinate anti-HIV/AIDS activi-
ties. These would include providing leadership, legisla-
tion, and enforcement regarding sensitive gender, cultural
and sexual practices and roles. The State has responsibility
for the health of its citizens and its function also encom-
passes negotiation of intellectual property rights on say,
drug patents, including the use of emergency rights avail-
able in the World Trade Organisation rules, important not
just for current health technologies, but future innova-
tions too [7].
The model of the State that the mitigation strategies
assume is the SDS which views the State's role as provid-
ing public goods (health, education, physical infrastruc-
ture, regulation) with the market delivering all other
goods and services [8]. Allied to this are democratic
accountability, institutional decentralisation (defined as
the devolution of decision-making to sub-units i.e. closer
to the ground, thus able to address needs and deliver serv-
ices more equitably and effectively), and good governance
reforms (which include anticorruption measures – like
judicial independence), with civil society participation to
provide a voice and discipline the State (table 2). The SDS
assumes that the highest level of technology is achievable
through decentralised institutions (in this case ARV).
Table 1: Health technology for mitigating HIV/AIDS (simplified to illustrate)
Health technology interventions/mitigation strategies
Behavioural and Educational 
prevention
Treatment of Sexually 
Transmitted Infections
Antiretroviral Therapy
Human capital/expertise Field-based (including peer) health 
educators and promoters
Nursing-level Medical-level
Physical Infrastructure Minimal, community meeting, 
radio/TV campaigns
Health centres Health centres, hospital and 
laboratory facilities
Organisation Local community level Intermediate – drug and 
monitoring network
Coordinated drug and laboratory 
network, treatment monitoring




Table 2: summarising the Service Delivery State
Service Delivery State
Political arrangement Democracy (multi-party), good governance
Institutional structure Decentralised for service delivery
Technology achievable Highest level – antiretroviral therapy
Source: AuthorsPage 2 of 5
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in SSA
The experience of mitigation in SSA can be divided into
those countries that have seen some "success" namely an
active and sustained response that has stalled (and possi-
bly reduced) the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and those that
have not achieved this. We reviewed the published litera-
ture and attempt to compare these responses with the SDS
model and have focused on low-income SSA countries as
they bear the bulk of the disease burden and are the target
of the mitigation strategies.
The "successes"
The "successful" countries are generally acknowledged as
Uganda and Senegal. The evidence [9-12] points to the
following successful features: strong political leadership
from the president and others in government; political
stability, a coordinated and agreed nationally "owned"
strategy involving non-State (especially faith based) actors
over time; the distribution and disposition of political
power in society (the political settlement) is committed to
a strategy which is in turn context specific (rather than
driven by internationally determined policies too focused
on technical solutions); an institutional structure
matched to the political settlement; and, investment over
time in the health infrastructure to produce a step-wise
adoption of health technology recognising the capacity
limitations present in a country (e.g. initial centralised
provision).
The "failures"
In contrast the "unsuccessful" countries, those that have
not mounted a meaningful mitigation response reviewed
here are Zambia, Namibia, and Ethiopia. The evidence
[13-15] finds the following.
A failure of political will to tackle influential groups that
may block mitigation (e.g. traditional rulers, religious
groups), and, build a committed response to the epi-
demic. Difficulties with decentralisation include a lack of
supervision and control, little interest (and hence funds)
in HIV/AIDS by some local decision-makers, inequities in
service provision, a need for improved information shar-
ing between national structures and the decentralised
entities. The evidence demonstrates the existence of a lack
of clarity regarding the powers and functions of decentral-
ised levels of government, poor financial frameworks for
fiscal decentralisation, and poor capacity of local officials
and councillors at a local level. Further, national man-
dates were not well clarified to local levels with service
delivery assigned to specific government agencies (e.g.
prevention of maternal-to-child HIV transmission, nutri-
tion). Building community coordination and integration
activities are lengthy and intensive yet were largely
unfunded. However, some promising developments of
decentralisation were noted – integrated local level plan-
ning, and local HIV/AIDS coordination systems linking
NGOs with local government to produce a more coherent
response.
Insights from SSA Political Economy and mitigation policies beyond 
SSA
Parkhurst reviews the experiences of several countries in
tackling HIV/AIDS and emphasises that to understand a
country's response to the epidemic one must look to the
context, namely the national culture, political environ-
ment and actors involved in implementing policy [16,17].
Parkhurst critiques the prevailing international policy
guidance as based on a policy model that sees response to
disease as determined by health need, and implementa-
tion as a local technical function; instead history shows
how HIV/AIDS is no different from other issues in the
necessity of understanding local contexts to produce effec-
tive policies.
Van de Walle in a major survey studied African political
economy in the context of donor imposed institutional
reforms of the past two decades [18]. He finds that less
donor-supported institutional reform had happened than
expected, instead – paradoxically – elites have been
strengthened by such reforms. Reform periods have been
characterised by change and uncertainty raising the
chance of corruption. The net effect has been a decline in
State capacity coupled with weaker accountability and
transparency.
These findings are echoed by Szeftel who sees institutional
reforms as imposing rules and regulations developed for
rich liberal democracies on very different environments
like SSA [19]. These reforms are concerned with stability
(of markets, private enterprise and civil society) and
change ultimately fails as the existing interests are left
intact.
Discussion of the findings (table 3)
Uganda and Senegal achieved more success as they had a
clear goal to tackling HIV and had commitment from
important societal stakeholders that the State led and
encouraged. Both countries recognised the limitations of
their capacity and adopted health technologies appropri-
ately (and attempted a sequenced development over
time). Both developed a mitigation strategy suitable for
their context and were able to some extent to draw donors
into this vision. The other countries, in contrast, did not
have such a clear and wide political commitment; rather
there was a superficial articulation of this, if at all. Ethio-
pia, for example, suffered from political instability and
mitigation at the lowest technological level (behavioural/
educational interventions) was barely delivered.Page 3 of 5
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ments in both the successful and unsuccessful groups, but
with success due to a committed pro-mitigation political
settlement. Institutional decentralisation (as in Namibia)
is to be carefully considered as the findings point to gaps
in capacity (also accountability and coordination) under-
mining mitigation. The experience of Senegal, for exam-
ple, points to the benefits of centralisation as a way of
delivering higher technology interventions in a capacity
constrained environment.
Importantly the findings emphasise the primacy of politi-
cal commitment and that it need not be democratically
based. There is no clear evidence of the benefit of democ-
racy and decentralisation in delivering mitigation (includ-
ing ARV use). All this points to the inadequacy of the SDS
suggesting that a different model of the State may be nec-
essary to understand the context in a particular country
and then develop a successful strategy. This alternative
model has to address specific issues in State failure. Unfor-
tunately, there are few studies of country performance in
tackling HIV/AIDS particularly from a political economy
perspective and the ones that are available (and reviewed
here) tend to be reports which may not have been subject
to peer-review.
However the experience of Uganda and Senegal demon-
strates that their approach to HIV mitigation (as a devel-
opment challenge beyond merely health) has similarities
with the East Asian States' significant successes in their
social and economic development. Political economic
studies of this success have highlighted a possible alterna-
tive state model – the Developmental State (DevS).
Issues and determinants of State failure
The DevS sees the critical area of state failure as the lack of
adequate institutional and political capacity to produce a
dynamic societal transformation towards greater social
and economic development. Such states are described as
having two elements- ideological and structural [20]. The
ideological drive is a commitment to development by the
State with other key societal actors being willing partici-
pants (i.e. the political settlement is committed to devel-
opment; in the HIV context, a commitment to mitigation
as seen in Uganda and Senegal). The structural compo-
nent refers to the capacity of the state to implement poli-
cies effectively, with this capacity being determined by
other constituent capacities – institutional, technical and
political.
The political settlement is key, successful States are a task
of "political engineering" as much as "institutional engi-
neering" [21]. The mismatch between the political settle-
ment and institutions can explain State failure when
institutions from one context are placed in another (as in
the SDS approach using an industrialised country health
policy solution template [5]). Effective institutional
enforcement requires institutional capacity and compati-
bility with the underlying political settlement. These
descriptions have a resonance with the earlier findings on
successful and unsuccessful mitigation experiences.
The SDS recognises this political importance in a limited
way, hence the good governance institutional agenda. But,
there is a distinction to be made between power and insti-
tutional structures. The distribution of power may not
match institutional "paper" structures. The establishment
of formal institutions (say, a National AIDS Control Com-
mittee) may be unsuccessful in this context where the
informal institution of power is with competing interest
groups. Spending on mitigation may be diverted or con-
tested by these groups, and there is also the possibility of
the fragmented and unproductive acquisition of health
technology rendering it less effective in a few years e.g.
through ARV resistance.
Different institutional arrangements of a State lead to dif-
ferent consequences for what the State can achieve or not
[21]. In making the centralise/decentralise decision, the
following should be considered – the type of technology
(and wider social benefits and co-ordination problems),
the level of overall development of a country which would
indicate the capacity of the State and the nature of the
bureaucracy. For example, an eroded bureaucracy (e.g.
due to the HIV epidemic) makes implementation of insti-
tutional reforms challenging.
Table 3: summarising the empirical evidence of low-income SSA States' success in mitigating HIV/AIDS
"Successful" States "Unsuccessful" States
Political arrangement Varied: democracy (Senegal, multiparty), 
authoritarian (Uganda)
Varied: democracy (multiparty, Zambia), others 
including authoritarian (Namibia, Ethiopia)
Institutional structures Centralised (now decentralising) Varied (decentralised and centralised)
Technology achieved STIs, some ARV through centralised institution Some behaviour/education, centralised STIs, 
sparse centralised ARVs
Source: Authors
STI – Treatment of sexually transmitted infections
ARVs – antiretroviral treatmentPage 4 of 5
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Finally history has shown that SSA State elites have tended
to be strengthened following imposed institutional
reforms. Particular groups may gain preferential access to
ARV's thus entrenching inequalities perhaps preventing
any new social contract arising from the epidemic. Donors
insist on decentralisation, and in a capacity-constrained
environment this means reliance on NGOs and non-State
actors risking a lack of accountability, poor regulation/
performance monitoring, a variation in standards, inequi-
ties in access and uncertainty over funding timescales
Summary
This is a broad look at the State and mitigation, limited by
the evidence-base on SSA State performance. Whilst more
research is indicated, little support for the current SDS
model is found. Rather the DevS model is preferred as it
recognises that a context specific approach is necessary,
taking into account the existing political settlement and
institutional and technological solutions, along with a
long timescale coordinated strategy designed and led by
the State with involvement of wider society specific to its
particular history and culture. International institutions
and donors should reconsider promoting a "one-size-fits-
all" approach to mitigation; especially overlooking the
crucial role of the State.
A rethink considering the political economy of the State
would lead to more effective and sustainable HIV/AIDS
mitigation strategies in SSA countries. For instance, States
can act to introduce a new form of health financing/taxa-
tion, acquire trade and debt concessions, invest in human
capital and local pharmaceutical industries and so on. The
battle against HIV/AIDS in SSA States is no less than a
social transformation and as such should be linked to
wider development goals to be truly effective.
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